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Production 5g.

DCI/IC 74-1674

2 July 1974

25X1 MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : KIQ Baseline Report

Attached is a copy of the KIQ Baseline Report from It is too late for processing in the pilot program, however, it is currently KIQ #22 in the FY 75 NIO draft, and could serve as one of the items for detailed information audit. It is certainly one of the most important items.

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IC KEP Monitor

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Office of the Director
of Central Intelligence




DATE: 28 June 1974

TO:

25X1

SUBJECT: KIQ Base Line Report

Attached is the KIQ Base Line Report for the KIQ 2b. We are not disseminating it other than to you because we understand the Director is going to make some modifications late Monday. If you have any questions please give me a call.



Assistant NIO/CF

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Attachment

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26 June 1974

SECTION A KIQ BASE LINE REPORT, KIQ ASSESSMENT

KIQ NUMBER 2b

SOVIET OBJECTIVES IN ARMS AGREEMENT NEGOTIATIONS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICE
FOR CONVENTIONAL FORCES

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26 June 1974

1. Community Assessment

The community assessment is amply reflected in NIE 11/12-73, "Soviet and East European Attitudes towards MBFR," 4 October 1973, and the memorandum to its holders, dated 7 May 1974.

2. Uncertainties and Differences

Although there is a general unanimity of opinion in the community about the Soviet's MBFR policy, there are several areas of uncertainty. The more important of these involve: the effects on Soviet policy of the unsettled political situation in many western states; the rigidity of their negotiating team's instructions regarding their draft agreement of 8 November; the extent that the current positions in Vienna reflect short term personal or institutional influences in Moscow rather than long term Soviet objectives; and the aggregate manpower and equipment numbers which the Soviets and other Pact participants will use as the basis for force reductions.

These and other uncertainties are particularly troublesome with regard to MBFR because of the dynamic quality of the negotiation process. In the course of talks which are expected to continue for several years, the Soviet position will in addition be affected by a number of variables, the most obvious of which is knowledge, gained overtly or covertly, of the NATO position or of differences and disagreements among the NATO members. Other elements, such as the Middle East situation, will have important implications for MBFR insofar as they affect the overall policy of detente of which MBFR is a part.

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Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

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30 July 1974

Approved For Release 2004/05/05 : CIA-RDP80M01082A000800150009-3

MEMORANDUM FOR: CIA Member, USIB

SUBJECT : Key Intelligence Questions for
FY 1975

1. The components of CIA have reviewed the DCI's 1 July 1974 statement, "Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975," and find them to be a much improved formulation. I agree with these reactions, and believe the current draft--Revised Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975 issued on 29 July 1974--to be a workable statement of substantive objectives for the Community. I was also pleased, at the recent USIB discussion, to note that the evaluative parts of the KIQ/KEP process are undergoing a much-needed recasting that, hopefully, will make them a much less burdensome and more meaningful exercise.

2. There is a tendency among the production components in this Agency to suggest new topics for the KIQs. Among these were such far-ranging questions as Soviet strategic naval deployment; government stability in Latin America; Chinese conventional forces; political trends in Portugal and Spain; new/alternative sources of energy; foreign science and technology. All of these, of course, are important questions, but part of the reason for their submission is the natural tendency of managers to have all of their activities covered by a KIQ. To accept all such suggestions would make the listing of KIQs a meaningless statement of all of the Community's missions and functions. I much prefer to settle for a more limited list, accepting the fact that a wide number of activities do not lose their vitality simply because they are not listed as a KIQ.

3. I have a few specific suggestions that may improve and refine the 29 July statement (see attachment).

25X1

EDWARD W. PROCTOR
Deputy Director for Intelligence

Attachment

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SUBJECT: Key Intelligence Questions for FY 1975

ADDI/ [] b (29 July 1974)

Rewritten: DDI/EWProctor (30 July 1974)

Distribution:

Original - DDI

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Remarks:			
<p>Attached is a memorandum reflecting the feelings of the various CIA components re the draft FY 1975 KIQs scheduled for discussion at this week's USIB meeting. You might want to incorporate one or more of the suggestions into the final version of the KIQs.</p> <p>This memorandum had been prepared for the information of General Walters; however, it appears he will not be attending USIB and I will be sitting in for him.</p> <p style="text-align: right;"><i>Ed Proctor</i> Ed Proctor</p>			
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FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.			DATE
Deputy Director for Intelligence			30 July
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